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From : Asst. Deputy Chief of Staff (Information).

HEADQUARTER, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTH EAST ASIA

Date : 2[....?] Feb 46

Ref: 5035/2/

To : B.G.S. (Ops), Headquarters, ALFSEA

ADCOS (Infm)

Subject : **Account of Brigadier Mallaby's death.**

Attached is a factual account of the circumstances
culminating in the death of Brigadier Mallaby.

2. This was written by Capt. D. Wehl who has gone to
great pains to exclude any matter that cannot be vouched for.

[Signed]

Brigadier,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Information)

S E C R E T

From:

26 Feb 46

Capt D Wehl
Acting ADPR AFNEI
Koningsplein West 9
B A T A V I A,

Dear Brigadier Wardell

Herewith the Mallaby story. This is as accurate an account as it is possible to have, and it is based on statements from officers who were there at the time. I have personally inspected the scene of the Brigadiers death, and there is no doubt that the Brigadier DID NOT give an order to "20 Indians to Open fire" for the simple reason that there were no Indians for him to give the order to. His car was on the far side of the square from the Coy.HQ and it was quite impossible for him to give any orders to anyone.

There are no officer or warcos here who know much about this incident, and in the excitement of the trip to Phlitt and the V.I.P's here there has been no comment on the story in this office, but there have been comments on the story at AFNEI HQ from some of the officers, who feel that Drieberg is not dealing quite fairly with the British soldier out here, who is doing a difficult job with the greatest restraint. No doubt Drieberg is quite sincere, but incidents that take place in Java, such as Mallabys death, or Bekasi, cannot be fully understood unless a most accurate and objective report is made on the spot and practically can be read into a short general description or merely one person's individual impression.

Incedentally the report you asked for on Bekasi I sent you while you were at Kuala Lumpur. I hope it reached you and was of some [..]me use.

Yours sincerely

(Sgd) David Wehl.

To: Brigadier J.S.M. Wardell, M.B.E.

ADCOS (INFM).

HQ SACSEA

DEATH OF BRIGADIER MALLABY AT SOURABAYA.

The scene of Brigadier Mallaby's death has an important bearing on the incident.

"D" Coy, under command of Major VENUGUPAL, was quartered in a big office building with a large open square in front reaching to the Kali Mas (canal) and the bridge. Mallaby's death took place on the far side of the square from the building, so that he was actually in sight of safety but unable to reach it, while Major Venugopal could see the Brigadier in danger but was unable to rescue him. The square was crowded [crowded] with armed Indonesians and an attack was made on the office building with "D" Coy inside it while the turmoil was still swirling round the Brigadier's car. There were, in fact, two separate incidents taking place in the square, which probably accounts for the divergent reports of this event.

At 1600 hrs a crowd of armed Indonesians had collected in front of "D" Coy building, coming right up to the front door. No fire was directed against them. The Indonesian shouted to Major Venugopal to come out and surrender, possibly because they mistook the truce that had been arranged as a sign of surrender. A signal was sent to Bde. HQ explaining the situation, and the reply was that "D" Coy was to hold their fire as peace was almost then negotiated.

Approximately at 1630 five cars drew up in front of the building, with the Brigadier, three of his staff, Captain Smith, Captain Shaw, and Lt. Laughland, and five or six Indonesian leaders. The crowd of Indonesians round the door prevented the Brigadier from entering the building, and he had to talk to Major Venugopal by shouting across a distance of about ten yards. Major Venugopal explained the situation, and the Brigadier ordered the Indonesian leaders who had come with him to disperse the crowd. These men climbed on the roofs of cars and harangued the crowd for about thirty minutes, and about half the crowd began to disperse. The situation looked easier, and the Brigadier's party re-entered their cars and moved off across the square. They nearly reached the bridge across the canal when they were stopped again. Had they been able to get over the bridge the Brigadier might never lost his life.

The cars were surrounded by a surging mob. The Indonesian leaders with the Brigadier again attempted to address the crowd, but a wild man leapt up on to a car and made a inflammatory speech inciting the crowd to kill. The mob reacted violently, shouted "Merdeka" and man handled the Brigadier, who was unarmed.

Major Venugopal had great difficulty in restraining his Coy from opening fire when they saw what was happening. A MMG had now been brought up almost to the front door of building at point blank range, the crowd surged forward to the front door of the building on the verandah, and a few were in the building itself.

It was getting dark. The Coy was being attacked, and the Brigadier was still surrounded and could not be reached. Major Venugopal therefore took the decision to open fire [fire], A number of 36 grenades were dropped on to the road and they were fired on. About 150 were killed and the crowd withdrew from round the Brigadiers car.

While the firing was going on the Brigadier, Captain Smith, and Lt Laughland, lay on the floor of the car. They shared two cigarettes between them saying "this is it". They had with them one 36 grenade, which was later to enable the two captains and the lieutenant to escape.

When [when] the firing had ceased from "D" Coy the Brigadier sat up in the car. Some Indonesians approached and Mallaby leant forward to hear what they had to say and he was shot died immediately. Lt Laughland then threw the 36 grenade, and in the resulting confusion all three staff officers were able to dive into the canal and escape.

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