

**Transkrip Arsip WO 203/2455 Keterangan (Baru) Kapten Smith (tertanggal 10 Mei 1946)**

No. 6823/140/PS/CAS/A.  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, INDIA,  
Adjutant General's Branch,  
Delhi, the 9/10 May, 1946.

Headquarters,  
Adv. A. L. F. S. E. A.

SUBJECT: Death of Brig. A.W.S. Mallaby, C.I.E., O.B.E.

With the reference to your telegram No./GO 2 dated the 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 1949, addressed to Troopers, a copy of the report regarding the circumstances of the death in respect of the late Brig. A.W.S. Mallaby, C.I.E., O.B.E., made by Capt. R.C. Smith, is forwarded herewith as requested.

[Signed]

O.S.

For ADJUTANT GENERAL INDIA

Encl: 2.

Report on the death of Brig. A.W.S. Mallaby.

1. Fighting broke out in Sourabaya on 28<sup>th</sup> Oct 45, and continued intermittently until 30 Oct 45. On that date, Maj. Gen. Hawthorn, Comd 23 Ind. Div, flew to Sourabaya with Dr. Soekarno, President of the Indonesian Republic. They held a conference with Brig. Mallaby and the leaders of the various parties in Sourabaya at which it was decided, among other points, that the Indonesian troops would return to their barracks, and that 49 Ind Inf Bde plus the RAPWI whom we were protecting, would concentrate in the dock area. Maj. Gen. Hawthorn and Dr. Soekarno then left. Fighting however, continued throughout most of the town, the party leaders making no apparent efforts to quell it.
2. At approx. 1730 hrs on 30 Oct. Capt. T.L. Laughland and I, both Liaison officers at HQ 49 Ind Inf Bde. were ordered by Col. L.H.O. Pugh, DSO, 21C of the Bde, to proceed to the Government Office, where we were each to collect an Indonesian representative. From there one of us was to go north, and the other south, through the town, and try to persuade the mobs to go back to their barracks. Brig. Mallaby was this time in conference with the Governor in the Government offices. On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO, Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
3. The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yds west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One coy of 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians and had been in considerable difficulties. On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given. We then got into the cars, and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yds when we were stopped by the mob, approximately 20 yds from the Kali Mas.
4. From then on, the situation rapidly deteriorated, the mob leaders, who in the opinion of all of us were Japs, began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved and the pistols pointed at us, and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
5. Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid down their arms and marched out: they and us were guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt. Shaw, who was well known to some of the Indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Sourabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countermanded this: on further consideration he decided that the Company had been in so bad a position before that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out. He did not believe in the safe conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the Company might get away. Accordingly, Capt. Shaw was sent in to the building to give the necessary orders. The rest of us were disarmed, except for grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed, and made to sit in the back of one of the cars. The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
6. When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the Company Commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre, and so the order to open fire was given. As soon as firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier's window with a rifle. He fired four shots at the three of us all of which missed. He then went away, while we shammed dead.

7. The battle went on for about two and a half hour, to about 2030 hrs by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesian were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed, and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier's side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and then one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier's side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half a minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead.

8. As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt. Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland's shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned, and threw it out of the open door by the Brigadier's body. As soon as it had had exploded Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, and then ran round the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attempt to interfere with us, it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade, which also set the back seat of the car on fire.

9. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our own troops in the Dock area.

#### Notes.

1. The following questions may arise over the above report:
  - a. Why did we not, at any time, try to reach the building in which our troops were?
  - b. Why was the grenade not thrown earlier?The answers are as follows:
  - a. Once the mob had become threatening, we were at least 100 yds from the building, across a square packed with Indonesians. We would not have been allowed to give five yards.
  - b. We had no indication that the Indonesian troops who had been firing from the vicinity of the car had withdrawn, even though they had stopped firing. Consequently, we did not expect to get away even at the time the grenade was thrown.
2. In the report made by Capt. Laughland and myself the following morning, we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantaneously. This was done in order to spare the feelings of his family.

Sd/ R.S. Smith,  
Captain.